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The phenomenon of child soldiers has gained increased attention since the 
condemnation, last year, of Thomas Lubanga for recruiting and using child 
soldiers. However, not much has been said about the crimes perpetrated by 
those children. This article looks at child soldiers as perpetrators of crimes 
and examines their potential criminal accountability under international 
criminal law. Interpretation of international instruments suggests that child 
soldiers could be prosecuted by international criminal tribunals. However, 




Child soldiers can be viewed as victims, recruited to commit 
military acts against their will. The act of recruiting child soldiers is a 
war crime1; however, as soldiers, they may be perpetrators of the 
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8(2)(e)(vii); Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, signed 16 January 




crimes of torture, maiming, rape, and the killing of civilians.2 
Therefore, the question arises as to whether they should be held liable 
for these crimes. Indeed, one may wonder why children would be 
shielded from prosecution when they commit such crimes. The aim of 
this article is to explore the arguments given in favour of and opposed 
to the criminal liability of children in order to establish conclusions 
regarding the liability of child soldiers under international criminal 
law. One may feel that children should be held accountable for their 
crimes because it would serve justice for the victims; however, it 
appears to be difficult to defend accountability for children who may 
be too young to be considered capable of committing crimes, or, in 
many situations, who acted under duress when committing crimes. 
The legal discussion on the issue of criminal liability of child soldiers 
is primarily based on the concept of mens rea. In other words, 
international criminal law must determine whether child soldiers can 
actually intend to commit international crimes.  I will examine the 
difficulties raised by the prosecution of children at the international 
level. I will proceed to present arguments in favour of child criminal 
liability, thereby arguing that child soldiers should be prosecuted.  I 
will place emphasis upon the obstacles to the prosecution of child 
soldiers. I conclude by arguing that if child soldiers are to be 
prosecuted, the minimum age for criminal liability should be fixed at 
fifteen years old and all the guarantees of a juvenile justice system 
should be offered.  
 
I 
ISSUES WHEN DEALING WITH CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CHILDREN AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
 
So far, child soldiers have never been prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals. Nevertheless, it is important to think 
about the theoretical possibility of the prosecution of children because 
of the increasing attention being given to the issue of child soldiering. 
Even so, the criminal liability of children is a difficult concept to 
think about at the international level for two reasons. First, 
                                                            
2 Matthew Happold, “Child Soldiers, Victims or Perpetrators?” (2008) 29 U La Verne L 
Rev 56 at 79 [Happold, “Child Soldiers”].  
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psychological development varies from one child to another, which 
leads to a difficulty in determining when the required element of 
mens rea is acquired. Second, no minimum age for criminal liability 
exists under international law because countries conflict on what this 
age should be.     
 
A.   PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHILD AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE REQUIRED MENS REA ELEMENT 
 
An accused can be found liable under international criminal 
law only when the actus reus is committed with intent.3 This is 
referred to as mens rea. A crucial aspect to take into consideration in 
any discussion on the criminal liability of children is the ability for 
one child to act with this required intent. Many authors have written 
on the psychological development of the child and the subsequent 
ability to intend to commit a criminal act.4 Their studies demonstrate 
that, up to a certain age, a child is not fully able to understand his or 
her acts, nor the consequences attached to it; however, the exact age 
at which an individual can commit a criminal act with the required 
mens rea element is not clearly determined. This is a problem, in the 
sense that, from a psychological point of view, some children should 
be able to be found liable under international criminal law while 
others should not. 
This conclusion is supported by neuroscientific research. 
Professor Naomi Cahn suggests that even though “the law has not 
historically depended on brain science, (...) the modern study of 
neuroscience offers the prospect of identifying more specific causes 
[related to adolescents’ criminal behaviours].”5 In her paper dealing 
with the impact of neuroscience on understanding child soldiers’ 
actions, she mentions that early abuse and neglect can change the 
structure of children’s brains: “when children are abused or neglected, 
their brains may develop so that they overact to situations that are 
                                                            
3 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 30. 
4 Jean Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1932) [Piaget]; L Kohlberg, Child Psychology and Childhood Education - A Cognitive 
Developmental View (New York: Longman, 1987). 
5 Naomi Cahn, “Poor Children: Child “Witches” and Child Soldiers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa” (2006) 3 Ohio St J Crim L 413 at 429.  
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threatening so that delinquent behavior results from the brain using 
these early lessons of fear to defend itself.”6 These elements show that 
child soldiers are different from adults because their psychological and 
biological development is different. These observations must be taken 
into account when examining their criminal liability. Another huge 
difficulty in determining whether child soldiers could be held liable 
under international criminal law is the fact that international law 
does not provide for a minimum age of criminal liability. 
 
B.   ABSENCE OF MINIMUM AGE FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
The minimum age for criminal liability represents the age at 
which an individual can be legally prosecuted for crimes. Under 
international law, an adult is understood to be an individual who has 
attained the age of eighteen years.7 It follows from this that if a child’s 
criminal liability does not exist, only adults can be prosecuted for 
international crimes. On the other hand, if liability does exist, the 
minimum age for criminal liability does not correspond with the age 
at which majority is attained. How is the age of criminal liability to be 
determined? This central question has unfortunately stayed 
unanswered under international law for decades. There is no 
overarching agreement among nations; the minimum age for criminal 
liability differs widely from one country to another, with one of the 
youngest ages fixed at six in some Mexican states for non-federal 
crimes, while the oldest age fixed at sixteen years in Argentina.8 
International law does, however, provide minimal guidance 
on how to determine what the minimum age should be. The United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile 
Justice (or “Beijing rules”) provide that:  
                                                            
6 Ibid at 426.  
7 Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, Can TS 
1992 No 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) [CRC]. This treaty is one of the most 
widely ratified international instruments. In article 1, it states that “For the purposes 
of the present Convention, a child means every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier.” This may be understood as an international consensus.  
8 UNICEF, “Special Protections: Progress & Disparity” in The Progress of Nations 
1997, online: UNICEF <http://www.unicef.org/pon97/p56a.htm>.  
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[i]n those legal systems recognising the concept of the age of 
criminal responsibility for juveniles, the beginning of that 
age shall not be fixed at too low an age limit, bearing in 
mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual 
maturity.9  
This non-binding notion was since codified and expanded in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) in its article 40(3): 
State parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, 
procedures, authorities and institutions specifically 
applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as 
having infringed the penal law, and, in particular: (a) The 
establishment of a minimum age below which children shall 
be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal 
law.10  
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (the “Committee”), which 
is tasked with interpreting the CRC, recommends that this minimum 
age not be too low; indeed, it has asked some countries to raise the 
minimum age provided in their domestic legislation.11 However, the 
practice of the Committee is of little help in determining a standard 
minimum age for criminal liability under international law. As noted 
by some:  
it is not helpful in seeking to move towards consistency 
when it [the Committee] criticizes the minimum age of 10 in 
England as being unlawful, while only recommending that 
Ireland, which had just raised the minimum age from 7 to 
                                                            
9 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice, 
GA Res 40/33, UNGAOR, 40th Sess, UN Doc A/Res/40/33, (1985) 206 [Beijing Rules], 
r 4. 
10 CRC, supra note 7, art 40(3).  
11 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child: Australia, 16th Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.79, (1997); 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child: India, 23d Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.115 (2000); 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child: Fiji, 18th Sess, UN Doc CRC/C/15/Add.89 (1998); Committee 
on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 8th Sess, UN 
Doc CRC/C/15/Add.34 (1995); Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding 




10, only consider reviewing the age with a view to 
increasing it.12 
Comments from the Committee are, however, helpful to the extent 
that they provide guidance as to how criminal liability shall be 
determined. For instance, the Committee believes that criminal 
responsibility should be based on objective factors such as age instead 
of subjective factors such as “the attainment of puberty, the age of 
discernment or the personality of the child.”13  
Similarly, international criminal law does not provide clarity 
in determining the minimum age of criminal liability. The statutes of 
various international criminal tribunals are conflicting on this point. 
While the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(“ICTR”) statutes are silent on the issue, the Serious Crimes Panels in 
East Timor have jurisdiction over minors over twelve years of age14 
and the Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) has jurisdiction to 
prosecute children over fifteen years of age.15 However, the statute of 
the SCSL strictly regulates prosecution of children under eighteen 
years of age and privileges rehabilitation as opposed to other 
traditional aims of punishment.16 The SCSL has never prosecuted a 
person younger than eighteen, and the Chief Prosecutor, David Crane, 
had made it very clear that he would not prosecute children.17 The 
Rome Statute gives jurisdiction to the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) to prosecute individuals over eighteen years of age.18 While 
some may interpret the Rome Statute’s provision as establishing a rule 
under international criminal law because of the permanency of the 
ICC and its potential universal jurisdiction, this argument neglects 
                                                            
12 Geraldine Van Bueren, Art 40: Child Criminal Justice (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2006) at 27.  
13 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Report on the 10th Session, 10th Sess, UN 
Doc CRC/C/46 (1995). 
14 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, Regulation 2000/30 
Section 45 On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedures, online: East Timor Law 
Journal <http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org/UNTAETLaw/Regulations/> 
15 Statute of the SCSL, supra note 1. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See IRIN, “SIERRA LEONE: Special Court will not indict Children” online: IRIN 
<http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=35524>.  
18 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 26. 
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two things. First, the provision is more procedural than substantive.19 
Exclusion from the jurisdiction of the ICC simply leaves the task of 
prosecuting child soldiers to domestic jurisdictions.20 Second, it 
appears that the exclusion was to avoid arguments before the ICC as 
to what the minimum age for criminal liability should be under 
international law.21  
In light of the above-mentioned considerations, one can say 
that a reasonable age to fix criminal liability should be somewhere in 
the mid-teens (thirteen, fourteen, fifteen).22 Most domestic systems 
recognize criminal liability around that age; therefore, this option 
would follow current state practice. It would also comply with the 
international guidance given on the issue. As well, it would be 
supported by psychological analyses that tend to demonstrate that 
from the age of fifteen years, children may be capable of moral 
responsibility. However, international criminal law must be precise 
and cannot vaguely prescribe that children in their mid-teens should 
be able to face international jurisdiction. Instead, a clear and precise 
age should be given. It would then be up to the court to determine 
whether it will prosecute children under eighteen. As was the case in 
Sierra Leone, a court might decide not to use its prerogative. The SCSL 
has the jurisdiction to prosecute children of fifteen years and older, 
and this would be a starting point in trying to determine what the age 
for criminal liability should be under international criminal law. This 
choice is reinforced by other provisions of international criminal law 
that have established fifteen as the minimum age to legally recruit and 
use children in armed forces.23 This suggests that from that age, 
children are capable of making independent choices. Under the age of 
fifteen, children cannot legally join armed forces and therefore, they 
should not be held liable for their crimes under that age. This is not to 
suggest that children under fifteen cannot be perpetrators of 
international crimes. Some may have committed crimes with full 
                                                            
19 Happold, “Child Soldiers”, supra note 2 at 79.  
20 Otto Triffterer, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Munchen, Germany: CH Beck, 2008) at 777. 
21 Ibid at 775.  
22 Matthew Happold, The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006) [Happold, “Age of Criminal 
Responsibility”]. 




conscience, but most of them might be too young to fully understand 
their acts. Similarly, children over fifteen may have committed crimes 
without fully understanding their acts. There is also some overlap, 
where children who were recruited before they were fifteen may 
have remained soldiers after, and subsequently committed crimes over 
the age of fifteen. A line must be drawn somewhere and the law must 
be clear. In most cases, children above fifteen do understand their acts 
and are capable of making independent choices such as joining an 
armed group. International criminal law has already recognized this 
and similarly, it should recognize fifteen as a compelling age for 
criminal liability.  
This section has demonstrated that prosecuting children at the 
international level would certainly not be without difficulties. The 
main issue would relate to determining who is a child; examining on a 
case-by-case basis whether a specific child’s psychological 
development allowed for an understanding of his or her criminal acts, 
and reaching a consensus on what the minimum age for criminal 
liability is. Thinking about whether child soldiers should be 
prosecuted by international criminal tribunals requires us to 
overcome these difficulties. It also requires justifications. In other 
words, if current practice of international criminal tribunals is to 
refuse to prosecute child soldiers, what would be the grounds under 
which one would say that, theoretically, they could be prosecuted? 
 
II 
RATIONALE FOR PROSECUTING CHILD SOLDIERS 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, international criminal 
law is not clear on the issue of the minimum age for criminal liability. 
While the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute children under 
eighteen, the SCSL has jurisdiction for those of fifteen years and over. 
This indeterminacy indicates that there is no categorical objection to 
the prosecution of children. Therefore, it is important to examine the 
rationales upon which international criminal law could rely, if it was 
decided that child soldiers could be prosecuted. Several arguments can 
be developed. First, such prosecutions are in accordance with the aim 
of international criminal justice. Second, they seem to be authorized 
by international human rights law. Third, most domestic systems 
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allow prosecutions of child soldiers and, in fact, some have done so. 
Finally, we are currently witnessing a case within international 
criminal law, that of Dominic Ongwen, indicating that the 
prosecution of individuals for crimes committed as children may be 
possible. 
 
A. AIM OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THEORIES OF 
PUNISHMENT 
 
International criminal law pursues several goals which are 
quite similar to the ones found under domestic law. These include 
retribution and deterrence, but also other goals such as bringing 
justice to the victims. Emphasis of these goals is important since they 
may give substantial grounds to the argument that child soldiers 
should be prosecuted. 
 
(i) Domestic Law vs. International Law 
International criminal law deals with the most serious crimes 
of international concern.24 International criminal tribunals have been 
established in order to make sure that those who violate these norms 
will respond to their acts. The idea is that some crimes are so horrific 
that the international community must ensure that perpetrators will 
not go unpunished. However, punishment may serve several goals and 
it is important to analyze whether theories of punishment found 
under international criminal law are the same as the ones found under 
domestic laws. One may think that the gravity of these international 
crimes, characterized by mass atrocity, would justify a different basis 
for punishment than domestic crimes. Moreover, the specificity of 
international criminality may justify additional aims for punishment, 
such as telling the history of a conflict or achieving reconciliation 
between societies.25 However, it seems that theories of punishment 
find the same grounds in international criminal law as in domestic 
criminal law. Drumbl expresses this view when talking about 
international criminal law that “despite the extraordinary nature of 
                                                            
24 Rome Statute, supra note 1. 
25 Robert Cryer et al, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 31, 33. 
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this criminality, its modality of punishment, theory of sentencing, and 
process of determining guilt or innocence each remains 
disappointingly ordinary.”26  
 
(ii) Retribution and Deterrence 
Theories of punishment have been developed to understand 
the rationale for prosecuting crimes that violate our most fundamental 
norms. First, there is the justification of retribution. This theory is 
often associated with Immanuel Kant,27 and it is based on the idea that 
those who have violated social norms should be punished without 
regard for the possible benefits (or drawbacks) of a prosecution. 
Indeed, a wrongdoer should be punished only on the grounds that he 
or she has committed a crime. Other justifications such as the well-
being of the society are irrelevant because they equate to using a 
human being as a tool to accomplish a specific goal.28 This theory is to 
be distinguished from revenge. As explained by the ICTY: 
“[retribution] is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge 
but as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at 
these crimes.”29 Looking at the jurisprudence of the international 
criminal tribunals, retribution is, alongside deterrence, the most 
prominent punishment rationale.30 Moreover, it seems that in 
practice, international criminal law evidences a preference for 
retributive motivations.31  
Based on this retributive theory, child soldiers should be 
prosecuted merely on the basis that they committed crimes. The 
outcome here is seen as consequential; someone who does wrong must 
be punished. However, there is an issue with this outcome because it 
seems to neglect the mens rea element. If committing a criminal act is 
sufficient to allow prosecution, it implies that only the actus reus is 
                                                            
26 Mark Drumbl, “Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of 
Mass Atrocity” (2005) 99 NW U L Rev 539 at 541[Drumbl, “Collective Violence”].  
27 Cryer, supra note 25 at 24.  
28 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John Ladd 
(London: The MacMillan Publishing Company, 1965) at 100. 
29 Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1, Judgment (24 March 2000) at para 185 
(International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber) online: 
ICTY <http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf>. 
30 Drumbl, “Collective Violence”, supra note 26 at 559.  
31 Ibid at 561.  
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taken into account. Karl Marx wrote that G.W.F. Hegel’s theory on 
punishment would be the only valid one because it is the only one 
that “recognizes human dignity.”32 According to Hegel: 
[p]unishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his 
own will. The violation of right has been proclaimed by the 
criminal as his own right. His crime is the negation of right. 
Punishment is the negation of this negation, and 
consequently an affirmation of right, solicited and forced 
upon the criminal by himself.33  
Nevertheless, Marx also points out that individuals are acting under 
conditions of “capitalist unfreedom”34 and therefore cannot be held 
responsible for their acts.35 According to him, a theory of punishment 
is valid only where it elevates the criminal to “the position of a free 
and self-determined being.”36 Without entering in an analysis of class, 
Marx’s view on punishment could by extension be applied to child 
soldiers in that it is based on the concept of freedom. Are child 
soldiers really free when they commit a crime? Here is where the 
mens rea element appears. Where someone is not free, how can he or 
she commit an intentional act? The same logic could apply to adult 
perpetrators. This negates the mens rea element, which is a 
fundamental principal of criminal law. 
As opposed to a Kantian view of punishment, some may argue 
that the purpose of punishment is to serve society by promoting 
deterrence. According to Jeremy Bentham, all actions must create the 
greatest amount of happiness to the greatest amount of people.37 It 
follows from this that a criminal should be punished proportionally to 
the amount of harm which is caused by the offence and should be 
sufficient to deter further offences.38 One may wonder whether 
prosecuting child soldiers could be justified by deterrence because 
child soldiers do not really have a choice as to the crimes they 
                                                            
32 Karl Marx, “Capital Punishment” New York Daily Tribune (18 February 1853).  
33 Ibid.  
34 J Angelo Corlett, Responsibility and Punishment, 3d ed (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 
Springer, 2006).  
35 Marx, supra note 32. 
36 Ibid.  
37 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1988) ch I at 3.  
38 Ibid, ch XIV.  
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commit. Therefore, it is doubtful that the deterrence argument would 
be powerful in this case. 
Most of the time, retribution and deterrence would not be 
convincing justifications for the prosecution of child soldiers because 
child soldiers do not act under free will. However, this global 
reasoning is problematic because it neglects situations where child 
soldiers actually make free choices. These choices start at the stage of 
recruitment. It has been noted that “despite the ambiguity of 
"voluntary" recruitment in contexts of severely constrained choices, 
there is a complex rationale in a child’s decision to join whether for 
ideological commitment, self-defense or economic survival.”39 Some 
children may be more mature than others and some who join for 
ideological commitment may strongly believe in their causes. While 
some children do not freely and voluntarily join an armed group, 
many others may do so. We must not automatically decide that 
children do not have free will simply because they are children. It is 
possible for a teenager around fifteen years to have a strong moral 
understanding. Therefore, in these cases, it would be right to 
prosecute children for the purposes of retribution and deterrence. It 
has been argued that:  
it is reasonable to ask whether absolving children of 
responsibility for crimes they have committed is necessarily 
in the best interests of the child. In at least some cases, 
where the individual was clearly in control of their actions, 
and not coerced, drugged, or forced into committing 
atrocities, acknowledgement and atonement, including in 
some instances prosecution, might be an important part of 
personal recovery. It may also contribute to their acceptance 
by families, communities and society at large.40  
In the large majority of cases, retribution and deterrence could 
not justify prosecution of child soldiers for their crimes because their 
acts are not free. However, there may be some cases in which free will 
                                                            
39 Dana Landau, “Child Soldiers - The Use of Child Soldiers”, online: International 
Relations and Security Network 
<www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/content/.../01%20Use%20of%20Children.pdf>.  
40 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Global Report 2008 (London: Coalition 




and intent to commit crimes could be demonstrated. In these cases, 
prosecution could be justified under the grounds of retribution and 
deterrence. Prosecution of child soldiers could also be justified by the 
other goals international criminal law intends to achieve. 
 
(iii) Other Goals 
Apart from retribution and deterrence, international criminal 
justice has other goals which may be stronger grounds upon which to 
justify the prosecution of child soldiers. First, international criminal 
prosecutions may be pursued for the purpose of rehabilitation. 
According to this theory, the point of criminal sanction is the 
reformation of the wrongdoer.41 International criminal law applied 
this theory in the ICTY’s Erdomević case by condemning the accused 
to only five years of imprisonment, despite his conviction for taking 
part in an execution squad which murdered hundreds of Bosnian 
Muslim civilian men between the ages of seventeen and sixty. This 
was classified as a crime against humanity. He killed approximately 
one-hundred persons. The tribunal stated that he “should be given a 
second chance to start his life afresh upon release, whilst still young 
enough to do so.”42 Therefore, condemning child soldiers to low 
sentences may help them to reintegrate within the society while they 
are still young, and society would feel that the wrongs committed by 
child soldiers have been dealt with. It may also be more inclined to 
reaccept them and move forward.  
The aim of rehabilitation goes hand in hand with another 
one-that of bringing justice to the victims. Traditionally, international 
criminal law focused on the accused in the sense that it is necessary 
for the accused to benefit from a fair trial.43 However, international 
criminal law has been influenced by civil law systems such as France 
in which victims play a large part in the proceedings.44 The ICC has 
developed an original way of dealing with victims by allowing them 
to participate in the proceedings when their interests are affected.45 
                                                            
41 Cryer, supra note 25 at 28.  
42 Prosecutor v Erdemović, IT-96-22-Tbis, Judgement (5 March 1998) at para 16 
(International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trials Chamber). 
43 Cryer, supra note 25 at 478.  
44 Ibid.  
45 Rome Statute, supra note 1, art 68.  
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This is because it was recognized that one of the aims of international 
criminal law is to bring justice to the victims. As a result, “it would be 
paradoxical to keep saying victims should only have an auxiliary role 
when one of the reasons why proceedings take place is the victim 
itself.”46 Justice for the victims may be the most relevant justification 
when dealing with prosecution of child soldiers. One can hardly 
imagine how victims of child soldiers would reaccept these children as 
part of their community without feeling that justice had been done. 
Therefore, this idea of bringing justice to the victims is crucial. Recent 
history demonstrates that international law recognizes that victims 
should be heard. Following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, calls from 
victims of genocide to see the children who participated in it being 
prosecuted led to the arrest and detention of many children within 
Rwanda.47 This situation represented the first time in history where 
children accused of committing genocide were imprisoned and tried.48 
Another example relates to Sierra Leone. At the time of discussions in 
2000-2001 surrounding the creation of the SCSL to address crimes 
against humanity and war crimes committed after November 30, 
1996, it was said that “the people of Sierra Leone would not look 
kindly upon a court which failed to bring to justice children who 
committed crimes of that nature and spared them the judicial process 
of accountability.”49 Many children’s rights advocates argued that 
child soldiers should not be prosecuted within the SCSL;50 
nevertheless, the UN Secretary-General stated that:  
Within the meaning attributed to it in the present Statute, 
the term “most responsible” would not necessarily exclude 
children between 15 and 18 years of age. [...] the gravity and 
seriousness of the crimes they have allegedly committed 
would allow for their inclusion within the jurisdiction of the 
                                                            
46 Cryer, supra note 25 at 479.  
47 Chen Reis, “Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting 
Children for Participation in Internal Armed Conflict” (1997) 28 Colum HRL Rev 629 
at 629.  
48 Ibid.  
49Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 





Court.51   
Thus, the Statute for the SCSL permits the Prosecutor to prosecute 
individuals who were aged between fifteen and eighteen years at the 
time of their crime.52 
Prosecuting child soldiers at the international level could be 
supported in some cases by motives of deterrence and retribution. 
However, the most convincing argument would be that such 
prosecutions would form part of the process of bringing justice to the 
victims. The idea that children could be prosecuted was supported by 
some international organizations such as Amnesty International. It 
stated, “[i]n some cases, child soldiers must be held accountable for 
their actions, but any criminal action against them must respect 
international fair trial standards.”53 Nevertheless, it is important to 
acknowledge tensions between the various existing motives for 
punishment. Retribution and deterrence being the primary goals of 
international criminal justice, we cannot be sure whether prosecution 
of child soldiers, when justified solely by the necessity to bring justice 
to the victims, would be appropriate.  Moreover, victims may not see 
criminal prosecutions as the best way to obtain justice, for instance in 
societies where the focus is on reconciliation and forgiveness. 
However, prosecution of child soldiers can be justified on another 
ground; that being that such prosecutions are allowed by international 
human rights law. 
 
B. ALLOWED BY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
 
Because of the newness of international criminal law, many 
unresolved issues, such as the question of whether or not child 
soldiers can be prosecuted, may find some guiding answers in the 
more established but related field of international human rights law. 
Therefore, it is important to see what that area of the law 
recommends. Interestingly, international human rights law does not 
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argue against child prosecution. Analysis of the CRC is a very strong 
indicator of the views of the international community on issues 
related to children’s rights due to the fact that it is the most widely 
ratified international human rights instrument.54 The CRC does not 
explicitly say that prosecution of children is authorized. Instead, it 
contains provisions on the criminal liability of children, stating that if 
a child is to be prosecuted, certain conditions must be respected. This 
is a strong indicator that the international community, through states’ 
ratifications of the CRC, agrees that child prosecution could occur and 
a fortiori is authorized. Indirectly, it also means that the international 
community thinks that children can have the necessary mens rea 
when committing a crime. This conclusion conforms to the laws 
applicable domestically. Indeed, “under many national legal systems 
children as young as ten years (or even less in some jurisdictions) are 
deemed capable of forming the requisite intent to commit a crime.”55  
The fact that an international treaty as widely ratified as the 
CRC recognizes that prosecution of children can occur at a domestic 
level impacts our understanding of international law. Indeed, 
provisions of the CRC have crystallized under customary international 
law.56 Indirectly, this indicates that the international community is 
not substantially opposed to the prosecution of children at the 
international level. However, should children be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals such as the SCSL, these tribunals 
would have to respect standards provided by the CRC. Nevertheless, 
                                                            
54 “By July 1, 1997, virtually every nation had ratified or acceded to the CRC, with the 
exception of the United States and Somalia”: Jonathan Todres, Mark E Wojcik & Cris 
R Revas, eds, The Convention on the Rights of the Child - An Analysis of Treaty 
Provisions and Implications of US  Ratification (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
2006) at 14.  
55 Steven Freeland, "Mere Children or Weapons of War- Child Soldiers and 
International Law" (2008) 29 U La Verne L Rev 19 at 49.  
56 Customary international law reflects a general practice perceived as having the 
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international tribunals have looked at the CRC for guidance and to support their 
decisions, thereby reflecting general practice. See Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 US 
551; also see Sahin v Germany (2003) ECHR, 30943/96, 36 EHRR 43; Sommerfeld v 
Germany (2003) ECHR, 31871/96; Reports of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Art 64(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights) (2002), Advisory 
Opinion OC-17/02, Inter-Am Ct HR (Ser A) No 17 online: 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/series_A_OC-17.html>.   
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one can argue that international crimes are different from domestic 
crimes. Therefore, the analysis at the international level should be 
different from the one that occurs at the domestic level. The main 
issue here occurs in terms of mens rea. As noted above, for many 
countries, children are capable of having the intent to commit a 
crime. However, Happold notes that others have argued that 
international crimes cannot be intentionally committed by children 
because they require such onerous mens rea requirements that 
children will always lack capacity to commit them.57 Happold 
disagrees with this, and argues that while genocide requires specific 
intent, other international crimes do not require such a high burden 
of proof and therefore this argument cannot be used to distinguish 
between crimes committed under domestic laws from crimes 
committed under international law.58 This argument is powerful and 
emphasises the idea that the intentional element is the same for 
international crimes as for domestic crimes only when dealing with 
war crimes. This means that the CRC is to be understood as applying 
in the same way to domestic crimes and war crimes. It could apply 
differently to genocide. 
The idea that children can be prosecuted when they commit 
crimes is supported by the international community through wide 
ratification of the CRC, but also through ratification of regional 
treaties. For instance, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child (“African Charter”) contains a provision on the 
administration of juvenile justice.59 This instrument has been ratified 
by thirty-seven African states out of fifty-three.60 This means that, in 
addition to agreeing through ratification of the CRC children can be 
prosecuted, a large majority of African states reiterated their 
commitment to this idea. In addition, the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”), which is also governed by a regional treaty, ruled in 
the same way. In the case of two ten year-old boys who abducted and 
killed a two year-old and were convicted,61 the ECHR ruled that: 
                                                            
57 Happold, “Child Soldiers” supra note 2 at 72.  
58 Ibid.  
59 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, 11 July 1990, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (entered into force 29 November 1999), arts 17 and 30.  
60 Africa Union “Status of Ratification of the Charter as at February 2004”, online: 
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even if England and Wales is among the few European 
jurisdictions to retain a low age of criminal responsibility, 
the age of ten cannot be said to be so young as to differ 
disproportionately from the age limit followed by other 
European States. The Court concludes that the attribution of 
criminal responsibility does not in itself give rise to a breach 
of Article 3 of the Convention.62  
However, the conclusion drawn from this decision can be contested in 
the sense that the two boys were tried in an adult court, before a 
judge and a jury and during public hearings.63 Therefore, no specific 
procedure as guaranteed by the CRC was used.64 
As illustrated above, international human rights law contains 
provisions on child criminal liability. Many domestic jurisdictions 
allow the prosecution of children who commit crimes and 
international human rights law acknowledges this fact. But in doing 
so, it also gives conditions under which such prosecutions can occur. 
For instance, it limits the range of sanctions by formally prohibiting 
the death penalty. Because international human rights law does not 
prevent national jurisdictions from prosecuting child soldiers, its 
corollary is that international human rights law does not go against 
prosecution of child soldiers at the international level as long as 
special standards are respected. 
 
C. DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
 
The Rome Statute of the ICC is being implemented at the 
domestic level by its States Parties. Most of these domestic 
jurisdictions have a juvenile justice system in place, thereby allowing 
prosecution of children. This indicates that, child soldiers could be 
prosecuted by many domestic systems, and this has, in fact, already 
occurred in several instances. 
                                                            
62 Ibid at 176. 
63 Matthew Happold, “The Age of Criminal Responsibility in International Criminal 
Law” in Karin Arts & Vesselin Popovski, eds, International Criminal Accountability 
and the Rights of Children (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), online: 
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(i) Implementation of the Rome Statute by Domestic Systems 
States party to the Rome Statute have a legal obligation to 
include the international crimes contained in the Rome Statute within 
their own domestic systems.65 For instance, in Canada, the Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act was introduced in order to 
“implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.”66 
Since the minimum age for criminal liability in Canada is twelve 
years, it means that, in theory, a child could be prosecuted in Canada 
for international crimes. Another example is the case of France, which 
is a monist system, meaning that the Rome Statute has a direct effect 
on domestic law.67 However, in order to be able to implement its 
obligation of complementarity, the French domestic system had to 
modify the criminal code.68 It was necessary to introduce the exact 
same crimes as the ones provided in the Rome Statute. Under French 
law, children are not criminally responsible unless they are capable of 
understanding their acts.69 This means that a child could be 
prosecuted under French law for international crimes. It is important 
to mention that 114 countries have ratified the Rome Statute and 
sixty-five of them have already implemented it within domestic law.70 
Thirty-five countries also have some form of advanced draft 
implementing legislation.71 This data suggests that, in sixty-five 
countries, individuals can be prosecuted for international crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ICC and another thirty-five countries 
                                                            
65 Art 1 of the Rome Statute provides that the ICC is complementary to national 
criminal jurisdiction. In his inaugural speech, the ICC prosecutor introduced the idea 
of positive complementarity. Under this principle, the ICC shall encourage national 
systems to prosecute crimes that fall under the ICC jurisdiction. It is to be contrasted 
with negative complementarity under which the ICC prosecute crimes within its 
jurisdiction when states are unwilling or unable to do so: Benjamin N Schiff, Building 
the International Criminal Court (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 
117.  
66 Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24.  
67 Constitution de la République Française, JO, 4 October 1958, art 55.  
68 Art 212-2 of the Criminal Code was modified by law 2010-930 du 9 août 2010 
portant adaptation du droit pénal à l'institution de la Cour Pénale Internationale.  
69 art 122-8 C pén.  
70 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, “Ratification and Implementation”, 





will soon be able to do so. As mentioned earlier in this article, most 
countries allow for the prosecution of children in their domestic 
system. This leads to the conclusion that, potentially, a majority of the 
countries in the world could prosecute children for international 
crimes within their domestic system. If most of the domestic laws, 
including those that have been imported from the international level, 
allow for the prosecution of children, then why should international 
criminal law rule in a different way? 
 
(ii) Domestic Prosecutions of Child Soldiers 
Theoretical considerations which state that child soldiers 
could be prosecuted by most domestic systems are supported to some 
extent by states’ practices. Child soldiers have been prosecuted in 
Africa and more recently by the United States. 
 
(a) In Africa 
In Africa, child soldiers have been charged under domestic 
laws for international crimes including war crimes. For instance, in 
2000, the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”) executed a fourteen 
year-old child soldier and, in 2001, another four aged between 
fourteen and sixteen were condemned to death.72 In the end, these 
children were not executed due to pressures from non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”).73 In Uganda, two former child soldiers were 
accused of treason.74 However, these charges were later withdrawn, 
following lobbying by Human Rights Watch, on the basis that Uganda 
was under the international obligation to rehabilitate child soldiers. 
                                                            
72 Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Foreign Minister of Democratic Republic of 
Congo” (2 May 2001), online: Human Rights Watch 
<http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/index.html>; Human Rights Watch, Press Release 
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2001), online: Human Rights Watch <http:// 
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Child Soldiers” (June 2001), online: HRW <http://hrw.org/updatew/2001/06.html>. 
73  Ibid.  
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Another interesting case is the situation in Rwanda mentioned earlier, 
under which children were charged at the domestic level with 
committing genocide, an international crime implemented 
domestically. It was reported that almost 4000 children were detained 
in Rwanda following the genocide, only 1500 of whom had been 
released from detention by 2001.75 Two institutions allowed 
prosecution of child soldiers: the domestic courts and gacaca 
proceedings. Gacaca proceedings are a traditional method of dispute 
resolution adapted to promote accountability for offenses related to 
genocide.76 Gacaca proceedings are different from the Rwandan 
conventional courts because their focus is on both retribution and 
reconciliation.77 Because of this, gacaca proceedings offer a more 
diversified array of punishment ranging from imprisonment to 
community service.78 Gacaca proceedings also recognize that minors 
should be treated differently from adults. Minors under fourteen years 
cannot face prosecution but can be placed in special solidarity camps, 
whereas minors between fourteen and eighteen must benefit from 
reduced punishment.79 Rwandan legislation provides that offenders 
under the age of fourteen cannot incur penal responsibility.80 
Offenders between the age of fourteen and eighteen are entitled to 
raise their status as minors as a mitigating factor in sentencing.81 In 
prosecuting those responsible for genocide, the Rwandan courts 
applied these mitigating factors. For instance, a minor under eighteen 
found guilty before domestic courts of killing five Tutsi children was 
sentenced to only five years’ imprisonment.82 A last example is the 
one of DRC where, very recently, a fifteen year-old accused of rape 
was found to be outside the jurisdiction of a military court which tried 
individuals for crimes against humanity and was sent to be tried in a 
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domestic juvenile court.83 Read together, these elements may be 
interpreted as indicating that child soldiers may be prosecuted under 
domestic jurisdictions, under the condition that their status as 
juveniles is respected. Therefore, if they are to be prosecuted, juvenile 
justice systems should be used. 
 
(b) The Case of Omar Khadr 
Omar Khadr is a Canadian citizen who was born in 1986. It is 
alleged that his father “was a high-ranking member of Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad, a senior Al-Qaeda operative and a close associate of 
Osama bin Laden.”84 It is also alleged that from 1996 until 2001, 
Khadr:  
travelled throughout Afghanistan with his father meeting 
senior Al-Qaeda members and visiting Al-Qaeda training 
camps and guest houses. In the summer of 2002, he received 
personal training in the use of arms and explosives and, on 
completion of his training, joined a team of Al-Qaeda 
operatives constructing and planting landmines targeted 
against U.S. and coalition forces.85  
Khadr is accused by U.S. officials to have murdered the U.S. sergeant 
Christopher Speer by throwing a grenade at him during a firefight 
between U.S. Special Forces and a group of Al-Qaeda operatives.86 
Following his arrest and transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Khadr was 
charged under the newly created system of Guantanamo Military 
Commissions with “conspiracy, murder by an unprivileged 
belligerent, [and] attempted murder by an unprivileged belligerent.”87 
However, these commissions were later struck down as being 
unconstitutional.88 Instead, new charges were brought against Khadr 
                                                            
83 Kelly Askin, “Guilty”, online: Blog Open Society < 
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87 US v Omar Khadr, Case No 05-0008, United States Military Commission, online: 
<http://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120820T102927-
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after the Military Commission Act was signed.89 These include 
“Murder in Violation of the Law of War, Attempted Murder in 
Violation of the Law of War, Conspiracy, [and] Providing Material 
Support for Terrorism and Spying.”90 In October 2011, he entered a 
guilty plea.91 According to the plea agreement, Khadr pled guilty “in 
exchange for an eight-year sentence, with a likely transfer to a 
Canadian prison after one year.”92 
Khadr’s case is controversial in many aspects and his 
prosecution has been widely criticized. Commentators such as David 
Crane, the first Prosecutor at the SCSL, have argued that child 
soldiers, including Omar Khadr, should not be prosecuted. They are 
primarily seen as victims who do not have the choice but to kill and 
therefore lack the mens rea to commit war crimes.93 Other 
commentators such as Matthew Happold do not exclude the idea that 
child soldiers could be prosecuted under certain circumstances; 
however, they have criticized the process under which Omar Khadr 
was prosecuted.94 In prosecuting Omar Khadr, the United States did 
not respect its international obligations in terms of respecting juvenile 
justice standards.95  
Countries that have ratified the Rome Statute are under the 
obligation to prosecute individuals accused of international crimes. 
This obligation implies that when these countries have a functioning 
juvenile justice system, they are under the obligation to prosecute 
child soldiers when appropriate. However, due to states’ overlapping 
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obligations between the Rome Statute and other international treaties, 
states are also under the legal obligation to respect standards imposed 
by other international instruments. If domestic systems must 
prosecute child soldiers, respecting international standards, why 
would international criminal justice be different? 
 
D. OPENINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROSECUTION OF 
CHILDREN FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 
 
The argument that children could be prosecuted by 
international criminal tribunals is strengthened by the current legal 
framework. Indeed, the ICC appears to be heading in the direction of 
permitting the prosecution of child soldiers. The Lord’s Resistance 
Army abducted Dominic Ongwen when he was ten and he has since 
fought with that group.96 The ICC has issued an arrest warrant against 
him for three counts of crimes against humanity and four counts of 
war crimes.97 However, the question of whether he can be held liable 
is controversial because he is a complex political victim.98 His early 
victimization created the conditions under which he committed 
serious crimes and also the conditions under which he became one of 
the leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Dominic Ongwen has not 
yet been arrested and the mandate of the ICC only allows the 
prosecution of crimes that happened after 2002.99 At that time, 
Dominic Ongwen was already an adult. Therefore, the case does not 
directly illustrate a situation where an individual is being prosecuted 
for crimes committed when he was a child. It does show a willingness 
of the ICC to consider that victimization whilst a young child does not 
necessarily imply lack of the mens rea requirement once you are an 
adult.  
Child soldiers are not merely innocent victims. They are also 
perpetrators of international crimes. For this reason, arguments that 
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they should be prosecuted can be made. However, prosecuting child 
soldiers may not be in accordance with the mandate of international 
criminal tribunals, which is to prosecute those who are the most 
responsible.100 How can one seriously consider that a child who is a 
victim of the crime of recruitment, and used to participate actively in 
hostilities, would be the most responsible for the subsequent crimes 
that occur? In addition to this, if international criminal tribunals were 
to prosecute children, major difficulties would occur. 
 
III 
RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING THE PROSECUTION OF CHILD SOLDIERS 
 
The previous section emphasized the arguments one can make 
in favour of prosecuting child soldiers by international criminal 
tribunals. However, there are also strong reasons to advocate in favour 
of excluding such prosecutions. The prosecution of child soldiers 
should not be allowed by international criminal law for three reasons. 
First, even though the CRC contains provisions that can be 
understood as favouring prosecution of child soldiers, it also contains 
a provision on the best interests of the child. It is doubtful that 
prosecuting child soldiers would be in their best interests. Second, 
prosecuting child soldiers would raise serious practical issues. 
International criminal tribunals, with the exception of the SCSL, do 
not allow for such prosecutions. Though theoretically it would be 
possible for some criminal tribunals to do so, one should consider the 
difficulties that would arise. Third, in the event one argues that, 
theoretically, child soldiers could be prosecuted by international 
criminal tribunals and overcomes the challenges linked to such 
prosecutions, it is unlikely that such prosecutions would be a success. 
Indeed, child soldiers would be entitled to raise defences provided by 
international criminal law and would rule out their liability. 
 
A.   SPECIAL GUARANTEES AND THE “BEST INTERESTS” OF THE CHILD 
 
The CRC contains provisions on child criminal liability which 
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allows one to think that the CRC supports prosecution of children. 
However, these specific provisions have to be read in accordance with 
article 3 of the CRC which refers to the “best interests” of the child as 
a primary consideration.101 The Beijing rules also establish that the 
aims of juvenile justice should include an emphasis on the “well-being 
of the juvenile.”102 It is difficult to see how international prosecution 
of children who are victims of those who recruit and use the soldiers 
would serve the best interests of these children. Instead, the purpose 
of juvenile justice is rehabilitation and, therefore, criminal 
prosecutions should be a last resort.103 Moreover, in the context of the 
debates on whether or not the SCSL should prosecute child soldiers, 
some argued that the prosecution of child soldiers would not serve 
their best interests and other solutions such as truth and 
reconciliation commissions might be more appropriate.104 The Report 
from the UN Secretary-General mentions that: 
 the international non-governmental organizations 
responsible for child-care and rehabilitation programmes, 
together with some of their national counterparts, however, 
were unanimous in their objections to any kind of judicial 
accountability for children below 18 years of age for fear 
that such a process would place at risk the entire 
rehabilitation programme so painstakingly achieved.105  
                                                            
101 CRC, supra note 7, art 3.  
102 Beijing Rules, supra note 9, r 5.  
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The Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed 
Conflict argued that:  
based on the current practice of ad hoc tribunals, the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court, 
there is an emerging consensus that children below the age 
of 18 should not be prosecuted for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity by international courts.106  
Moreover, some argue that children “have no place at a war crimes 
tribunal, no matter how benevolent such a tribunal may be towards 
them.”107 
Prosecuting child soldiers may not be the best way to ensure 
their reintegration and therefore, it may be against their best interests. 
Even if prosecutions were not a barrier to their best interests, other 
issues would have to be considered. 
 
B. PRACTICAL ISSUES 
 
Currently only the SCSL allows for prosecutions of child 
soldiers, but it has never used its power to do so. This section aims at 
giving an idea of practical concerns which international criminal 
tribunals, including the ICC, would have to face if child soldiers were 
prosecuted before them. International criminal tribunals simply do 
not have the resources in place to ensure solid application of the rights 
that should be guaranteed to juvenile offenders. In the CRC, children 
are guaranteed procedural rights that are common to adults such as 
the presumption of innocence but also specific rights  such as the right 
to privacy at all stages of the proceedings.108 International criminal 
proceedings are structured around the principle of public hearings and 
this principle is included in the statutes of international criminal 
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tribunals.109 Exceptions to the principle of public hearings are 
provided by the Rome Statute in order, for instance, to protect 
victims, witnesses or the accused.110 However, the Statute of the SCSL, 
which allows for the prosecution of child soldiers, does not contain 
any provision on the practical application of the right to privacy of 
children. It only mentions that “the accused shall be entitled to a fair 
and public hearing, subject to measures ordered by the Special Court 
for the protection of victims and witnesses.”111 The issue here is to 
determine what the “measures” are. One can imagine that protective 
measures would be the same accorded to victims and witnesses of the 
ICC such as protection of identity or distortion of voices and faces.112 
However, there is currently one very controversial protective 
measure, which is the use of anonymous witnesses.113 It has been 
argued that it goes against the principle of transparency and fair trial 
for the accused.114 Does the right to privacy include the right to be 
prosecuted anonymously in the case of child soldiers? 
Another practical problem with prosecuting child soldiers is 
the double role they may play. In the ICC, victims’ participation is a 
novelty and has appeared to be necessary.115 The Rome Statute 
provides that: 
where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the 
Court shall permit their views and concerns to be presented 
and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be 
appropriate by the Court and in a manner which is not 
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prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused 
and a fair and impartial trial.116  
But what about case situations where victims are the same as the 
perpetrators? Would it be fair to prosecute a child as a perpetrator 
while knowing that he or she could also be considered a victim? 
Wording of the Rome Statute indicates that as long as personal 
interests of the victims are affected, these victims shall be able to 
present their views and concerns at all stages of the proceedings. 
Child soldiers cannot be prosecuted by the ICC. However, if this was 
an option, it means that child soldiers accused of international crimes 
and prosecuted by the ICC could legitimately request the status of 
victim. This duality victim-perpetrator would pose a major challenge. 
 
C. DEFENCES UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
 
International criminal law is governed by general principles of 
liability. In order to be found criminally liable, the elements of actus 
reus (criminal act), mens rea (intent to commit a criminal act) and 
grounds for excluding liability have to be examined. Concerning 
crimes committed by child soldiers, the actus reus may be quite easy 
to prove, assuming a prosecutor can locate witnesses or other 
evidence. The next step is to examine whether the child had the 
intention to commit such an act. As mentioned above, domestic 
systems are entitled to determine a minimum age for criminal liability 
under which an individual is deemed to be criminally irresponsible. 
Such provisions are used to reflect the idea that, up to a certain age, an 
individual does not have the capacity to fully understand his or her 
acts and the consequences of these acts. Therefore, a lack of mens rea 
is presumed. As noted earlier, international criminal law does not 
determine a minimum age for criminal liability, so one cannot say 
exactly where the line is to be drawn. However, one might suggest 
that since the ICC does not have jurisdiction to prosecute minors, 
minority status is a valid ground to go unpunished.117 Child soldiers 
could also raise the defence of intoxication. Many studies have shown 
that child soldiers are compelled to take alcohol or drugs in order to 
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make them become fearless.118 Since the use of both impairs judgment, 
international criminal law recognizes that involuntary intoxication is 
an excuse.119 Last but not least is the defence of duress. Child soldiers 
are subjected to brutal indoctrination methods used by the armed 
groups to which they are part. It has been reported that children who 
disobey their commanders are savagely killed in front of other 
children in order to set an example.120 In these circumstances, child 
soldiers are constantly under the threat of being tortured or killed. 
Executing orders is the only way to survive for those children. The 
Rome Statute clearly indicates that a person is not criminally 
responsible when the crime was committed under duress.121 However, 
in the Erdemović case, the ICTY said that duress was only a mitigating 
factor.122 Since duress is approached differently by the various 
international criminal tribunals, it is not clear whether child soldiers 
could use this defence as an excuse that would rule out their liability. 






Child soldiers are complex political individuals who can be 
considered both victims and perpetrators. If—contrary to calls from 
most children’s rights organizations, child soldiers who committed 
crimes are to be treated primarily as perpetrators—one should make 
sure that a child is indeed legally capable of committing crimes. The 
main issue when trying to answer the difficult question of child 
criminal liability is the mens rea requirement. Can a child have the 
intention to commit an international crime? No minimum age for 
criminal liability is determined by international law for the reason 
that no consensus can be reached. This age depends on the conception 
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each state has of childhood and therefore, it widely differs from one 
country to another. Arguments in favour of the prosecution of child 
soldiers find support in the theories of punishment, in international 
human rights law and in domestic practices. Moreover, international 
criminal law provides some openings towards this option. Arguments 
given against the prosecution of child soldiers are grounded in the 
idea that the best interests of the child should be respected. In 
addition to this, in the event prosecutions occur, children would 
benefit from defences provided by international criminal law. 
Based on the above considerations, child soldiers should never 
be prosecuted under the age of fifteen. However, prosecution of 
children between fifteen and eighteen is not necessarily the best way 
to implement the right to reintegration promoted by the CRC. This is 
the reason why children between fifteen and eighteen could be held 
accountable in ways other than criminal prosecutions, for instance by 

















123 Mark Drumbl, “Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy” 
(Working Paper No 2011-17, Washington and Lee University School of Law, 
September 2011) online: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1921527>.  
 
